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Abstract 
 
Some anti-discrimination laws have the perverse effect of harming the very class they 
were meant to protect.  This paper provides evidence that age discrimination laws belong 
to this perverse class.  It exploits an unusual aspect of the policy for enforcement of the 
federal 1968 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which made filing an age 
discrimination claim less burdensome in some states than in others.  After the 
enforcement of the federal law, white male workers over age 50 in states where the 
federal government allowed 300 days to file a discrimination complaint worked between 
1 and 1.5 fewer weeks per year than did workers in states without laws.  These men were 
also .3 percentage points more likely to be retired and .2 percentage points less likely to 
be hired.  These findings suggest that in an anti-age discrimination environment, firms 
seek to avoid litigation through means not intended by the legislation—by not employing 
older workers in the first place. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
The 1968 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits 
discrimination against older workers in hiring, laying off, firing, compensation, or other 
conditions of employment.  The original motivation behind the ADEA was lawmakers’ 
concern that employers incorrectly perceive older workers to be less productive or are 
unwilling to make modest adjustments to accommodate these workers.  The U.S. 
Department of Labor Report (1965) that examines the need for older worker protection 
states that employers are making “assumptions about the effect of age on the ability to do 
a job when there is in fact no basis for these assumptions.”  Lawmakers today seek to 
encourage labor force participation to ease the projected Social Security budgetary 
shortfalls and they worry that capable older workers are not granted job opportunities 
(Butrica et al. 2006).  Although the labor market fortunes of older workers tend to be 
better than those of younger workers, older workers are less likely to find employment 
after being separated from a job (Chan and Stevens 1999, 2001, 2004, Diamond and 
Hausman 1984).  When older workers do find new jobs, they are clustered into a smaller 
set of industries and occupations than are younger workers (Hutchens 1988).        
 The question this paper addresses is whether age discrimination legislation itself, 
both at the federal and state levels, has had negative consequences on employment 
options for older workers that were unintended by the original framers of the law.  There 
are three margins on which these laws can affect older workers’ employment levels: 
firing, hiring, and retirement.  Employment may increase or decrease for older workers 
depending on which margins are most affected by the laws.  First, a firm affected by 
these laws will be unlikely to fire an older worker outright for fear of a lawsuit.  
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However, it is very difficult to prove or detect discrimination in hiring, and thus 
employers may choose not to hire older workers who will be difficult to fire, especially 
because class action lawsuits were not allowed under the ADEA during the time period 
studied (Donohue and Siegelman 1991, O’Meara 1989).  Finally, because the line 
between unemployment and retirement tends to blur for older workers (Choi 2002), firms 
that wish to avoid being sued may increase retirement incentives for these workers (rather 
than fire them outright), thus decreasing the employment of older workers.  On first 
examination, increasing retirement incentives for older workers may seem to benefit both 
the workers and the company.  However, if the increase in retirement incentives is 
coupled with an increased threat of layoffs, then the resulting increase in retirement may 
not be entirely voluntary.  Because it is difficult for older workers to find new 
employment, the possibility of losing one’s job without the retirement package is a worse 
prospect for older workers, who may feel that they have no choice but to accept the 
retirement package, than for younger workers, who have a higher probability of finding 
new employment (Lahey 2005).  Indeed, Schuster and Miller (1984) find that 31 percent 
of cases brought under the ADEA before 1981 involved involuntary retirement.   
This paper uses state age discrimination laws matched by state and year to the 
March monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) to look at retirement outcomes for 
protected workers.  To investigate the impact of hiring and job separation outcomes for 
older workers, I constructed measures of separations and accessions (hires) by matching 
CPS rotation groups as in Bleakley et al. (1999).  My empirical strategy uses the 
assumption that, because of an unusual provision in the federal law, workers in states 
with their own age discrimination laws are more likely to be affected by the federal 
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ADEA law.  Under this law, workers in states with age discrimination laws have almost 
twice as long to file.  Additionally, in states with these laws, state Fair Employment 
Practices (FEP) offices may be able to process claims more quickly than the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), though this is not guaranteed.  Thus, I 
compare workers who are affected by the law in states with laws and workers who are not 
affected by the law in states with laws to those who are in states without laws.   
I find that age discrimination laws, including state laws, had no negative effects 
(using CPS March monthly data) on labor market outcomes before the 1968 federal law 
was enforced and given to the EEOC in the late 1970s.  Even after enforcement, these 
laws also did not affect older women or minorities, possibly because minorities are 
granted stronger protections under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and this cohort of older 
women in general did not file age discrimination lawsuits.1  After the 1979 enforcement, 
white male workers over the age of 50 in states with age discrimination laws worked 
fewer weeks per year and were less likely to be hired or separated from their jobs, but 
were more likely to be retired (perhaps involuntarily).2  These findings suggest that firms 
do not wish to hire older workers most affected by the law, are afraid to fire older 
workers, but remove older workers through retirement incentives in states where lawsuits 
are less of a hurdle for the worker.   
Although the hope is that anti-discrimination laws will raise employment and 
wages for members of protected groups, a number of studies suggest that these laws may 
                                                 
1 Although the decision of whether to file under the Civil Rights Act or the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (or both) is dependent on the individual circumstances of a case, from the hiring 
employer’s perspective, race and gender may be more salient features than age, or employers may have 
different beliefs about the propensity to sue of older women and older minorities than older white men.  
Gregory (2001) argues that women did not sue under the ADEA in the earlier time period because with 
their lower wages and, unlike Title VII, no allowance for punitive or “pain and suffering” damages, women 
did not stand to gain much from an ADEA lawsuit. 
2 I also look at wage outcomes, but do not find any effect of the laws on wages. 
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be coupled with side-effects not intended by the law-makers.  For example, Gruber 
(1994) finds that although mandates that stipulated that childbirth be covered 
comprehensively in health insurance plans did not change employment levels, they 
caused a decrease in wages of women of child-bearing age.  Similarly, DeLiere (2000), 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), and Jolls and Prescott (2004), among others, find a 
negative effect on employment prospects for disabled workers following the 1990 
Americans with Disabilities Act.  My findings suggest that the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act falls into this class of laws with unintended consequences. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides 
background information on the legal environment surrounding age discrimination laws, 
including a brief literature review.  Section 3 explains my empirical strategy.  Section 4 
gives information on data and descriptive statistics.  Section 5 presents results, including 
robustness checks.  Section 6 concludes. 
2  Background 
The first state age discrimination law came on the books in 1903 in Colorado.  By 
1960, eight states had age discrimination laws.3  Although the U.S. Civil Service had 
banned maximum hiring ages in federal employment in 1956 and legislated against age 
discrimination in federal contracting in 1964, federal legislation protecting older workers 
overall did not appear until 1967 with the introduction of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, or ADEA.  The 1967 ADEA prohibited age-based discrimination for 
those aged 40-65 in firms with 20 or more workers.  Under this act, employers were 
                                                 
3 I have not been able to find any pattern to the introduction of these laws.  States with and without laws 
look very similar across measured characteristics.  In the robustness checks portion of the results section I 
run a test as if states with laws had introduced them 5 years earlier and find no evidence of any underlying 
differences between states that introduce and have not yet introduced laws. 
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barred from using age in hiring, laying off, firing, compensation, or other conditions of 
employment.  It also prohibited employers from using age-specific language in 
advertising.  Although Adams (2004) finds a small positive effect of the introduction of 
this law, most researchers agree that the federal law had little effect until the 1978 
amendment to the ADEA (Neumark and Stock 1999, O’Meara 1989).4  In 1978, 
Congress extended the protected age group to 40-70 and eliminated mandatory retirement 
for most federal employees.  A second major change, in terms of enforcement, came in 
1979 when the Department of Labor (and, for federal employment, the U.S. Civil Service 
Commission) gave administrative responsibility to the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  Most researchers agree that this change strengthened 
the power of the ADEA because the change came with an increase in resources and an 
increase in “pattern and practice” lawsuits  (Neumark 2001).5 
In 1986, Congress amended the ADEA to eliminate the upper protected age range 
for age discrimination, effectively eliminating mandatory retirement for all except in 
cases where a safety issue related to age might be considered a bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ), such as for pilots, or where the existence of job tenure would 
impose an undue hardship on the employer, such as for professors.6  In 1990, the Older 
                                                 
4 Neumark and Stock (1999) note that the existence of the law may have given plaintiffs higher standing in 
court even in the absence of enforcement mechanisms.  Additionally, O’Meara (1989) suggests that the 
1978 Supreme Court ruling (codified in the 1978 amendment to the law) that those bringing lawsuits based 
on age should have the right to a jury trial may have had a stronger effect than congressional changes to the 
law itself or its transfer to the EEOC, because juries are more likely than judges to find for the plaintiff in 
these cases (Hersch and Viscusi 2004).  Hersch (2006) finds that civil litigation cases in which jury trials 
are demanded are 5.5 percentage points more likely to settle without a trial than are cases where the right is 
waived.   
5 Although some law scholars argue that EEOC pattern and practice lawsuits are irrelevant, publicity 
surrounding the laws and the lawsuits could be the driving force behind differences in employer reaction to 
age laws.  O’Meara (1989) argues that while the 1964 law was passed with little publicity, the events 
surrounding the 1978 amendment and enforcement were well publicized.  
6 Ashenfelter and Card (2000) looked at the end of mandatory retirement for college faculty. 
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Workers Benefits Protection Act (OWBPA) imposed restrictions on the financial tools 
employers could use to induce worker retirement (Neumark 2001, O’Meara 1989).   
The procedure to file a claim under the ADEA differs importantly between states 
with and without their own age discrimination laws.  Because the EEOC has a large 
backlog of cases, it rarely prosecutes claims itself.  Instead, if a state has its own age 
discrimination statutes, then the ADEA requires the claimant to file with the state Fair 
Employment Practices (FEP) office within 300 days.7  Otherwise, in states that do not 
have statutes, the claimant must file with the EEOC within 180 days.8  The EEOC can 
then dismiss the claim, at which point the claimant may pursue a civil action in court, or 
the EEOC can seek to settle or mediate.  If the settlement or mediation is unsuccessful, 
the EEOC can then sue, or if it chooses not to sue, the claimant may sue (Neumark 2001).  
Over 95 percent of employment discrimination cases are brought by private attorneys, not 
the EEOC (Gregory 2001).9  Because claimants have more time to file if their state has a 
law, and, because the claim may be processed faster by the state FEP than the backlogged 
                                                 
7 In almost all cases after 1978, the state FEP office came into being after the age discrimination law 
(according to each state’s FEP office).  A regression that codes the state law as taking effect when the state 
has both FEP office and age discrimination law finds very similar results to those presented in the paper.  
Chen (2005) gives information on the 26 states that had FEP offices prior to 1964. 
8 “For ADEA charges, only state laws extend the filing limit to 300 days.”   
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/ overview_charge_filing.html.  This difference in time limits favoring those 
with state legislation, regardless of the number of days required to file by the state legislation itself may 
seem strange to those more familiar with other protection laws.  It is thought that the original intent of the 
legislation was to allow plaintiffs 180 days to file with their local state agency, in the hope that the state 
agency would settle the matter within the remaining 120 days before involving the federal government.  In 
practice, however, lags have been longer and courts have interpreted the law literally, allowing the plaintiff 
the full 300 days to file with both the state and federal agencies.  Unlike Title VII plaintiffs, ADEA 
plaintiffs do not have to wait between filing with the state and the EEOC; there is no Rule of Mohasco for 
ADEA claims.  Thus whereas a Title VII plaintiff could file with a state agency on day 240 at the latest in 
order to file on day 300 with the EEOC, an ADEA plaintiff could file with both on day 300.  Today most 
FEP offices have work-sharing agreements with the EEOC so that only one application is needed to file 
with both offices (O’Meara 1989, Lindemann and Kadue 2003). 
9 As a side-note, only 8 percent of employment discrimination cases filed in federal court proceed to the 
trial stage (Gregory 2001). 
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EEOC, claimants in states with age discrimination laws have less of a hurdle to suing 
than do claimants in states without those laws.10 
Awards are limited to “make whole” status and lawyers’ fees, that is, the award 
returns the plaintiff to where he or she would have been had he or she not been the 
subject of discrimination.  These awards include hiring, reinstatement or promotion, back 
pay, and restoration of benefits and lawyers’ fees.  Attorney’s fees often make up the 
bulk of the payment by the firm.  Unlike race cases covered by the Civil Rights Act 
(CRA), additional damages are not awarded except in cases involving willful violation of 
law and these are limited to twice the amount of actual damages (Gregory 2001, Levine 
1988, O’Meara 1989).11  Thus, among those who believe that they have been 
discriminated against during this time period, suing under the CRA may be more 
attractive to women and minorities, with their lower salaries on average, but the ADEA is 
the best option for older white men.12 
                                                 
10 Ideally, we would like to know whether or not the number of lawsuits and out-of-court settlements went 
up in states with and without laws.  Unfortunately, during the time periods studied, the EEOC did not keep 
track of age discrimination lawsuits, and out-of-court settlements are even more difficult to find 
information on.  The published studies that examine trends in age discrimination lawsuits, such as Schuster 
and Miller (1984), pull random samples from Lexis-Nexis searches.  Additionally, with protection laws, it 
is not clear that the number of lawsuits should go up in response to a change in the legal climate if, as I 
find, firms respond through diminished hiring of older workers where discrimination detection and 
prosecution is difficult and by limiting behaviors such as firing that could more easily result in lawsuits.  
All that would be needed to produce this change in firm behavior is publicity about the law, something that 
may be more prevalent in states with their own laws, not an increase in actual lawsuits. 
11 Gender cases did not allow punitive damages until the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 
12 The Americans with Disabilities Act was not introduced until 1991.  Indeed, regardless of other lawsuit 
opportunities, the expected costs of bringing an age discrimination lawsuit do not outweigh the benefits 
unless the plaintiff had a reasonably large salary or has lost pension benefits.  Joni Hersch (personal 
communication) has also suggested that lawyers may be unwilling to take cases on contingency fee unless 
the expected winnings are reasonably large and thus will not take on low paid female or minority clients for 
age cases.  Although lawyer fees can be charged on top of the regular in-court settlement, the size of a 
contingency payment in an age discrimination case may be smaller for women and minority out-of-court 
settlements because the expected in-court winnings would be smaller. 
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The majority of people who sue under the ADEA are white male middle 
managers or professionals over the age of 50.13  Employment termination in the form of 
wrongful discharge and involuntary retirement, not differential hiring, is the cause of 
most suits.  It is thus possible that the ADEA acts as a form of employment protection. At 
the beginning of EEOC enforcement, 14 percent of claimants were women.  By 1995 this 
number had risen to only 30 percent (Donohue and Siegelman 1991, Gregory 2001, 
Schuster and Miller 1984).  As mentioned before, women and minorities stood to gain 
less from bringing an age discrimination lawsuit than did white men because of their 
lower lost potential earnings and pensions.  In some cases they may have greater 
protection under the Civil Rights Act, which also allows punitive damages.  Thus my 
identification strategy focuses on white men over the age of 50, who are most likely to 
sue under the law.   
This paper is the first to examine the impact of the ADEA from its early years 
through a significant time period after its enforcement.  It also uses yearly CPS data and 
examines the effects on many segments of the labor force, not just those over or under the 
age of retirement.  Adams (2004) looks at the introduction of the federal law in 1968 and 
finds an increase in employment for those protected by the federal law and a decrease for 
those older than the protected ages.  His identification strategy relies on the assumption 
that states with laws prior to the introduction of the ADEA are not affected by its 
passage, an assumption that may or may not be valid because the 1968 ADEA had no 
enforcement mechanism.  There is also some question about the validity of the early CPS 
                                                 
13 O’Meara (1989) has a literature review for the demographics of people who brought lawsuits under the 
ADEA, including Schuster and Miller (1984). 
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that Adams uses in his pre-period.14  Neumark and Stock (1999) look at censuses from 
1940 to 1980, and thus have only one data point after the enforcement of the ADEA.15  
The census may not be the best source of data to examine the impact of these laws 
because it cannot follow year to year changes. 
The end of mandatory retirement in 1986 and 1994 has been more extensively 
studied than have other aspects of the ADEA.  Till von Wachter (2002) looks at the shift 
of mandatory retirement to age 70 in 1978 and its end in 1986 using imputed probability 
of being covered by mandated retirement and finds that the labor force participation of 
workers age 65 and older increases by 10 to 20 percent in 1986.  Mitchell and Luzadis 
(1988) find that in 1960, pension plans rewarded delayed retirement, but by the 1980s, 
union plans actively encouraged early retirement.  However, non-union plans still 
rewarded delayed retirement.  Ashenfelter and Card (2000) show that the abolition of 
retirement for college professors in 1994 reduced retirement for those age 70 and 71.  
Although the end of mandatory retirement is important, it does not tell the story of the 
entire effect of the ADEA, particularly the consequences of this legislation on older 
workers wishing to be hired or promoted and the effects on workers who are over the age 
of 50 (and thus “old”) but too young for mandatory retirement to have affected them.  
This paper fills these gaps in the literature.   
 
 
                                                 
14 According to the frequently asked questions on the Unicon website, www.unicon.com, CPS data prior to 
1968 are not supported by the census bureau, have small sample sizes, little documentation, and are missing 
information.   Additionally some of the questions on earnings were changed or recorded differently in 
1968. 
15 I update Neumark and Stock’s list of state laws for use in this paper.  In some cases I made corrections, 
but these corrections to their list were for laws after 1980 and thus do not affect their results.  The focus of 
Neumark and Stock (1999) is to test the effects of age discrimination laws on long-term Lazear contracts, 
confirming the hypothesis put forth in Jolls (1996) that the ADEA provides a commitment device for these 
contracts in the absence of perfect employee monitoring. 
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3  Empirical Strategy 
 To study the effect of state age discrimination laws, I use an OLS Differences in 
Differences specification: 
istεζϕθβββ +++∂++++= stsat50under ist350over ist21iit   )A * (H  )A * (H  X  y    (1) 
where i denotes individuals and t denotes time;  yit is either weeks worked, a dummy 
indicating employed, a dummy indicating retirement, a dummy indicating hired this 
month, or a dummy indicating being separated from a job this month; Xi is a set of 
controls including a dummy for married and a dummy for high school graduate.  H is an 
indicator that is equal to one if the state s in which the individual resides has an age 
discrimination law in year t.  50over iA  is an indicator equal to one if the individual is over 
the age of 50, and 50under iA is an indicator equal to one if the individual is age 50 or under.  
t θ  is a set of time dummies; sϕ is a set of state dummies; a∂ is a full set of age dummies; 
and stζ is a state specific linear time trend.  The assumption behind this strategy is that it 
is easier for workers to sue, and thus to enforce age discrimination laws, in states that 
have their own age discrimination laws than in states that do not.  Thus workers over the 
age of 50 in states with laws will be more affected than will workers in states without 
laws. 
 Equation (1) varies somewhat from the standard differences in differences 
equation, which would be:  
istεζϕθγγγ ++∂+++++= stast50over ist3st21iit    )A * (H  )(H  X  y  
where 3γ  is the effect of the law on workers over the age of 50 compared to workers 
under the age of 50 in states with laws.  This equation is equivalent to equation (1), in 
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that 2β = 2γ + 3γ  and 23 γβ = .  The reason for using equation (1), which compares 
workers over and under the age of 50 in states with laws to workers in states without 
laws, as the specification, is that one can more clearly see the effects of the law on the 
two different age groups in the sample.  2β  is the effect of having a law on workers over 
the age of 50 and 3β is the effect of having a law on workers age 50 and under, relative to 
workers in states without laws.  Age 50 was chosen as the age cutoff because white men 
over 50 are most likely to sue under the law.16 
 A second possible way of identifying is through a Differences in Differences in 
Differences strategy using women as a second control group.  Having lower salaries and 
less to gain from a lawsuit, these early cohorts of women are historically less litigious 
than are older men or women in later cohorts.  Additionally, because women’s 
attachment to the labor force is weaker than men’s, employers may figure that women 
will leave or retire on their own before they become a liability due to their age.  Thus 
employers may not see older women as constituting as much of a threat due to age 
discrimination laws as they do men.  My strategy is: 
+++=  )A * H*(M  )A * H*(M  X  y 50under isti350over isti21iit βββ +)A*(M 50over ii4β                (2) 
+ )A*(M 50under ii5β +)A *H ( 50over ist6β )A * H ( 50under ist7β + istεζϕθ ++∂++ stast       
                                                 
16 Workers age 40 are generally not considered old.  In fact, chief executive officers surveyed responded 
that on average age 43 represented the “peak productivity” year (Munk 1999).   Employers may believe 
that the 30s and 40s may be an ideal age to hire a new worker: the worker has had a chance to develop 
general human capital and is ready to settle down and is thus worth training in firm specific human capital.  
It is likely that the age of 40 was chosen rather than age 50 by lawmakers because if age 50 had been 
chosen there would be mass firings of workers age 49.  By setting the minimum age at a point where firms 
valuation of the worker is much greater than a potential lawsuit, the law avoids this potential problem.  
Additionally, because workers of age 40 are generally employable, even if they have been discriminated 
against in terms of age, they are more likely to find a new job rather than to spend time and money on a 
costly lawsuit.  Age 50, the age at which AARP membership begins and 5 years before many people vest 
their DB pensions, seems to be a reasonable cut-off point defining an “older worker” in hiring situations. 
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where i denotes individuals, t denotes time;  yit is either weeks worked, a dummy 
indicating employed, a dummy indicating retirement, a dummy indicating hired this 
month, or a dummy indicating being separated from a job this month; iM  is an indicator 
that equals 1 if the individual is male.  Hst is an indicator that is equal to one if the state s 
in which the individual resides has an age discrimination law in year t.  Variables Xi, 
50over 
iA ,
50under 
iA , t θ , sϕ , a∂ , and stζ are as defined in equation (1).  The assumptions 
behind this strategy are that it is easier for workers to sue, and thus to enforce age 
discrimination laws, in states that have their own age discrimination laws than in states 
that do not, and that women are less likely to be affected by these laws than are men.  
Thus, men over the age of 50 in states with laws will be more affected than either 
workers in states without laws or than women. 
 Finally, I try a more stringent identification strategy in terms of possible state and 
time trends by allowing state times year effects: 
istεθϕϕθβ ++∂+++= tsast50over ist1it * )A*(Hy                          (3) 
with variables defined as before. 
 
4  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 The first sample I use to look at the impact of age discrimination laws is drawn 
from the 1968-1991 March CPS and is limited to white men aged 25 to 85.  I break this 
set up into two smaller sets, one covering 1968-1977 and the other covering 1978-1991, 
because the Congressional committee reported on the ADEA in 197717 (amendments 
followed in 1978 and enforcement by the EEOC in 1979), and because of changes in the 
                                                 
17 http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=472&invol=353 
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CPS beginning in 1976.  I limit to 1991 because the introduction of the ADA provides 
new protection to older workers.18  The impact of the ADEA on employment levels is 
evaluated by looking at data on weeks worked during the calendar year preceding the 
March income supplement.  The impact on wages is measured using the average weekly 
earnings, computed using annual earnings data.  After 1979, the CPS prompted 
respondents to be sure to include overtime pay, tips, bonuses, commissions, and money 
from employers other than the primary employer.19  The impact on retirement and labor 
force participation is measured using the self-reported retirement and labor force coding 
from the CPS employment status variable.  The second sample I use is a matched 
monthly CPS.  I follow the algorithm developed in Bleakley et al. (1999) to match job 
flow variables.  These matched data allow me to measure the impact of the ADEA on 
hiring and job separation outcomes.     
CPS questions about weeks worked and income refer to the previous year.  The 
year reported in the tables and figures is the year in which the CPS was administered, not 
the year referred to in the questionnaire.  Questions about labor force status and 
retirement refer to the respondent’s main occupation in the previous week.  From 1968 to 
1976 in the early period, the CPS does not identify all states but groups some of them 
together.  For state groups in which all states in the group have the same law status for 
the year, I code these as having or not having the law depending on status.  If any state in 
the group does not have the same status as the others for the year, I drop these states for 
the years in which they disagree.  The basis for state laws was taken from Neumark and 
Stock (1999) and checked against several secondary sources.  When Neumark and Stock 
                                                 
18 Stock and Beegle (2004) examine the interactions of the ADA and the ADEA after 1991 and find 
different effects on employment for protected workers by age. 
19 Results are robust to removing 1978 as a year from the wage regressions. 
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(1999) disagreed with the secondary sources, these laws were checked against primary 
sources from Westlaw and from microfiche and hard copies of compiled state laws.  
Additionally, the list was updated for years not in Neumark and Stock using Monthly 
Law Review updates and Westlaw. 
 Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1.  As mentioned before, the universe 
is restricted to white males.  As workers get older, they are less likely to be unemployed 
and more likely to be out of the labor force.  The employment rate, weekly wage, and 
total income increase by age until age 45 in the early sample and age 50 in the later 
sample, after which they begin to drop.  Men in the set are more likely to be married as 
they get older until their mid-50s in the early sample and mid-60s in the later sample.  
Older cohorts are also less likely to be high school graduates.  Wage income and 
education levels are higher on average for workers in states with laws.  Average weeks 
worked is larger for workers in states with laws in the early period but not in the later 
period.  Men are more likely to claim to be retired in states with laws in the later period.20  
Figure 2 shows the dates that states implemented their age protection laws.  States 
without laws in the later period are more likely to be in the South.21 
 
5  Results 
5.1  Employment,  Wage, and Retirement Effects 
Figure 1 plots average weeks worked by white men aged 25 to 50 and those aged 
51 to 85 who worked in states with and without laws for those who worked a positive 
number of hours.  The number of weeks worked in Figure 1 is taken as the average of the 
                                                 
20 All of the aforementioned differences between states with and without laws are significant at the 5 
percent level with a t-test. 
21 Results in paper are robust when universe is limited to pre-1986 data. 
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midpoint of intervalled weeks worked per year.  The number of weeks worked by older 
men has been declining during this time period, although this decrease has leveled out in 
the 1980s.  Older men in states with age discrimination laws work more weeks per year 
than do older men in states without laws until the late 1970s, when the two lines begin to 
look more similar, while those corresponding for the younger men retain the same trend.  
This convergence suggests that the possibility of a new enforcement mechanism may 
have had an effect before the enforcement actually came in place in 1979 in states that 
were more aware of age discrimination legislation.  Weeks worked by younger men 
dropped as well from 1979 to 1982 and then increased through the rest of the 1980s.  In 
general, younger men in states without laws worked more weeks per year than those in 
states with laws.   
Table 2 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1).  The 
universe is white men between the ages of 25 and 85, inclusive.  The dependent variables 
are weeks worked, log weekly earnings, and retired.22  The controls in these regressions 
are dummies for married and high school graduate, and a set of age dummies, state 
dummies, and year dummies.23  Regressions are clustered on state.  The coefficients of 
interest are havelaw*over50, which is the interaction of the observation being over age 50 
and being in a state with a law, and havelaw*under50, which is the interaction of the 
observation being the age of 50 or under and being in a state with a law.24  The table also 
reports estimates from specifications including a linear time trend interacted with state.   
                                                 
22 The coefficient reported for retired is the marginal effect of the probit. 
23 Adding college graduate instead of high school graduate as a control changes the coefficient on 
over50*havelaw to range between -1.045 without a state year trend to -1.37 with a state trend, compared to 
-1.5 and -1.16 respectively. 
24 Recall that people in states with laws have more time to file a claim and can work with the state FEP 
agency rather than directly with the EEOC; thus they have less of a hurdle to file a lawsuit.  Even though 
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The results in Table 2 suggest a substantial and statistically significant decline in 
weeks worked per year for people over the age of 50 after it was announced that the 
ADEA would begin to be enforced in 1978.25  For example, in Table 2A, columns 3 and 
4 show a drop of between -1.1 and -1.5 weeks worked for older white men, those over 50, 
in states with age discrimination laws and essentially no effect on white men under 50 in 
those states.  In the early period, there is no effect on weeks worked for either older or 
younger workers, though this lack of finding may be due to measurement error in weeks 
worked per year, because prior to 1976 they were only reported in intervals.   
 Panel 2B of Table 2 reports estimates on log weekly wages of white men aged 25 
to 50 and 51 to 85 in states with and without laws.  Once state trends are added, there is 
no evidence of any effect on either older or younger workers in the early period, although 
again, because the variable, weekly wages, is manufactured from weeks worked and not 
all states are included in the early period, this finding may be an artifact of the data.26  
Additionally, without state trends, there is a significant positive effect on wages of older 
workers in states with laws and the point estimate remains positive once trends are added.  
In the later period, there is a positive effect on wages of older workers in states with laws, 
but this effect is not statistically significant.  Thus age discrimination laws may increase 
                                                                                                                                                 
the law covers workers over 40, in practice white men over the age of 50 are the most likely to sue.  Some 
states with laws also protect workers in firms with fewer than 20 workers.  Neumark and Stock (1999) code 
three states, Colorado, Georgia, and North Dakota as having “weak” laws in the post period.  Coding these 
states as not having a law does not appreciably change the results; for example, the coefficient on weeks 
worked in Table 2A(3) changes from -1.5 to -1.2 and is still significant at the 5 percent level. 
25 Weeks worked variable includes zeros for people who did not work any weeks. 
26 No evidence is found for an effect in the early period using annual wages either, suggesting that the lack 
of an effect on weeks worked may be real and not just an artifact of the interval data and missing states. 
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wages of older workers, but this wage effect is not significant once state trends are 
added.27   
 Panel 2C reports estimates on self-reported retirement of white men over and 
under 50 in states with and without laws.  Note that unlike the weeks worked and income 
questions, the retirement question is asked about the previous week, rather than the 
previous year.  In the early period, the effect on retirement is small and insignificant for 
older workers, and negative and significant for younger workers.  In the later period, 
older workers are .2 to .3 percentage points more likely to say they are retired in states 
with laws than are men in states without laws, though this effect is only marginally 
significant once state trends are added.28  This finding provides suggestive evidence that 
age discrimination laws encourage retirement in older workers.  This effect could be 
emerging through two different channels.  It could be that companies prefer to offer 
retirement packages to older workers rather than laying them off or firing them, thus 
decreasing the chance of a lawsuit.  Alternatively, it could be that unemployed older 
workers who face decreased chances of re-employment prefer to refer to themselves as 
retired rather than unemployed. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 Although Figure 1 suggests that the possibility of the enforcement of the federal 
age discrimination law may have affected employment of older workers in states with 
laws as early as 1977, when committees reported on the ADEA, an argument can be 
made for using the year 1978, when the enforcement was announced, or 1979, when the 
                                                 
27 If there is a genuine positive effect on wages, it may be because, as is shown later, firms are less likely to 
either hire or fire older workers.  Since firms often offer lower wages to new hires than to workers with 
long tenure, the average wage in this sample may go up. 
28 The base rate of retirement for all white men is .125, and .325 for those over the age of 50. 
18 
enforcement actually took place, as the start year for the later period.  Results using these 
later cut-off dates can be found in Table 3.  Again, the age range refers to the dates the 
CPS was administered, and thus refers to the earlier year for questions on weeks worked 
and income.  These results are substantively the same as those from 1978 to 1991, 
although in general the magnitude of the coefficients is somewhat smaller.  Additionally, 
the results for weeks worked per year lose significance at the 5 percent level once state 
trends are included in the regression.   
The age 85 was chosen as the top age in order to allow a generous top age 
specification while still eliminating possible outliers.  The typical person who sues under 
the ADEA, however, is a white male between the ages of 50 and 59.29  To test for 
sensitivity to the top age used, I run separate regressions with age universes topped at 75, 
65, and 59.  These results can be found in Table 4.  Again, there is no evidence of an age 
discrimination law effect on relative wages for these smaller age universes.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient of havelaw*over50 drops for both weeks worked per year 
and retirement as the age universe is trimmed, suggesting there might be a stronger effect 
on older workers.  Weeks worked per year is no longer significant when state time trends 
are added once 75- to 84-year-olds are removed and loses significance entirely once the 
universe is restricted below 65, although this result is not unexpected because the 
universe is smaller.  Retirement remains positive and significant for the 25- to 74-year-
olds without state trends but drops when the range is restricted to those under 65.  
Coefficient magnitudes are larger with older top age tails, suggesting that much of the 
effect of these laws is concentrated at later ages. 
                                                 
29  Schuster and Miller (1984) find that 55 percent of plaintiffs they studied from 1968 to 1981 are aged 
fifty through fifty-nine.  An EEOC study looking at different data from 1979 to 1983 found similar results 
by age (O’Meara 1989). 
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Similar regressions shown in Table 5, looking at women and minority groups, 
found no effect of age discrimination laws on weeks worked.  Protected minority groups 
are afforded greater protection under the Civil Rights Act (CRA) and can be awarded 
punitive damages in addition to “make whole” damages from the CRA, but not the 
ADEA and, with their lower average salaries, older women from these cohorts are not 
litigious.  Thus employers may not worry about age for these groups as they are more 
likely to be sued under the CRA and would have to pay out a larger settlement under the 
CRA.  Additionally, I may be finding no effect because employers may believe that, 
because women have weaker labor force attachment, they may leave before a lawsuit 
becomes an issue.  Sample sizes for blacks are small and are even smaller for other 
minority groups and thus may not be big enough to pick up an effect of age laws.  I do 
find a positive effect on weekly wages for black men of all ages in states with laws once 
state time trends are added in, but that may be a spurious result.  I also find no effect on 
retirement for these groups. 
Older white men in middle-management positions are most likely to sue.  
Therefore it may be of interest to break up the set by college education, since managers 
are more likely to be college educated.  Columns 5 through 8 of Table 5 report results for 
white men by college graduation.  In table 5A, results on weeks worked for both of these 
groups are very similar to those of the whole sample, with the coefficient of 
havelaw*over50 decreasing in magnitude and significance with state specific trends for 
the group of non-college graduates but increasing in magnitude and significance for those 
with a college education.  If there is a state-specific time trend to weeks worked that 
varies by education, then this trend would suggest that age discrimination laws do hurt 
20 
those in demographic groups that are more likely to sue.  Table 5C shows similar results 
for claiming retirement as an outcome; older non-college graduates are significantly more 
likely to claim retirement without a state-specific time trend but older college graduates 
are significantly more likely when a state-specific time trend is included. 
Table 6A reports OLS estimates of equation (2).  The universe is all white men 
and women between the ages of 25 and 85.  The dependent variable is weeks worked.  
The controls in these regressions are dummies for married and high school graduate, and 
a set of age dummies, state dummies, and year dummies.  Regressions are clustered on 
state.  The coefficients of interest are male*over50*havelaw, which is the interaction of 
the observation being male, age 50 or over, and being in a state with a law, and male* 
under50*havelaw, which is the interaction of the observation being male, under the age 
of 50, and being in a state with a law.  Women are less likely to sue under age 
discrimination laws than men, and as explained above, men in states with laws have less 
of a hurdle to suing than men in states without laws. 
The results in Table 6A agree substantially with the Differences in Differences 
results for older men using having a law as identification in Table 2.  There is still no 
significant effect of laws for either group prior to the discussion of federal enforcement of 
the law.  In the later period, the magnitude for older men is somewhat larger than the 
largest estimate in Table 2, with men in states with laws working almost 1.7 fewer weeks, 
using women and not having a law as controls.  Whereas the triple difference for men 
under the age of 50 is negative here, in the earlier calculation its sign depended on the 
inclusion of state trends, though again it is not statistically significant. 
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Table 6B reports OLS estimates of equation (3).  The universe is white men 
between the ages of 25 and 85.  The dependent variable is weeks worked.  The controls in 
these regressions are dummies for married and high school graduate, and a set of age 
dummies, state dummies, and year dummies.  Regressions are clustered on state.  The 
coefficient of interest is havelaw*over50, which is the interaction of the observation 
being age 50 or over and being in a state with a law.  These results also find a negative 
effect on weeks worked for older workers, with older workers working about 1.5 fewer 
weeks in states with laws.  These results are within the bounds of those found by equation 
(1) presented in Table 2, Panel A. 
On average, there is little clear evidence of an age discrimination law effect on the 
relative wages of older workers.  Therefore, the rest of this paper focuses on a further 
investigation of the employment and labor force participation effects, and the analysis is 
limited to the demographic groups for which the evidence for employment effects is 
strongest — white men between the ages of 25 and 85. 
 
 Endogeneity of state laws 
 To test for the possible endogeneity of state laws and pre-trends, in addition to 
adding state and year effects and trends, I run a specification check looking at the weeks 
worked outcome at a point five years before each state law was passed.  The assumption 
is that employers do not know that a law will be passed prohibiting age discrimination 
five years prior to the law.  No evidence is found that having a law five years in the future 
affects employment or hiring of either older or younger workers in the current period.  
The coefficient for weeks worked per year for older workers ranges from -0.091 (with no 
controls) with a standard error (SE) of 0.836 to -0.529 (with controls and a state trend) 
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with an SE of 0.714.  Coefficients for younger workers range from -0.330 with an SE of 
(0.570) to 0.310 with an SE of (0.824).  Thus there is no evidence, using this test, that the 
introduction of state laws is related to something that directly affects the differential 
employment of older and younger workers.30 
 
5.2  The Impact of Age Discrimination Laws on Hiring and Separations 
Workers may also be working fewer weeks per year not just because they are 
more likely to retire but also because they are having difficulty finding work once they 
have separated from a previous job.  Additionally, the law may be helping workers by 
decreasing firings and layoffs for older workers, because employers do not want to be 
sued.  I used matched CPS rotations groups for the entire year to investigate the effect of 
age discrimination laws on hiring and separation rates (see Bleakley et al. (1999) for a 
detailed description of the match).  An accession (hire) is recorded when someone who 
was not employed in month m is employed in month m+1.  Similarly, an individual is 
coded as having experienced a separation in month m if he is employed in any month m 
and not in month m+1 (individuals employed in December and not in January are coded 
as hired or separated in the January year).  This definition includes people who move 
from being employed to no longer being in the labor force as separated, and thus captures 
those who have voluntarily retired in addition to those subject to layoffs, fires, and other 
quits.  Neither hires nor separations include people who change jobs without leaving 
                                                 
30 Some may worry that since states in the South are later adopters and migrant retirees often retire to the 
South that my results may be biased towards finding no result.  However, the states with the largest in-
migration are not the same as the states that are late adopters.  Specifically, according to the census, the top 
10 states receiving in-migrants are:  1970:  FL, CA, AZ, NJ, TX, NY, OH, IL, PA, MO; 1980:  FL, CA, 
AZ, TX, NY, PA, NC, WA, IL, NY; and 1990:  FL, CA, AZ, TX, NC, PA, NJ, WA, VA, GA (Flynn et al. 
1985, Longino 1995).  As can be seen in Figure 2, these have a wide range of dates for law introduction.  
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employment.31  These measures of accessions and separations are the same as those used 
by Bleakley et al. (1999). 
As theory would predict, I find that older workers in states with laws are less 
likely to be hired than are workers in states without laws.  I also find that workers are less 
likely to be separated from their jobs, though these results are not statistically significant.  
Results of a probit using equation (2) with Hired and Separated as outcome variables can 
be found in Table 7.  Workers over the age of 50 in states with discrimination laws are .2 
to .3 percentage points less likely to be hired than workers in states without such laws.32  
There is also a small but not statistically significant (once controls are added) positive 
effect on hiring for workers under the age of 50 in these states.  Results on job 
separations are not as clear.  There is a trend of reduced job separations for workers over 
the age of 50 in states with laws and increased job separations for workers under the age 
of 50, but these results are not significant at the 5 percent level.  Because separations 
include retirements, which are more likely for older workers in states with age 
discrimination laws, I should be picking up two separate effects:  increased retirement 
incentives and decreased firing and layoffs.33  Still, I find that older workers in states with 
laws are .1 percentage points less likely to be separated than workers in states without, 
and this effect is probably a lower bound.34  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Because older workers may be more likely to be unemployed before finding a new job (Diamond and 
Hausman 1984), this definition may overestimate older “hires” and “separations” and underestimate 
younger “hires” and “separations.” 
32 The base for hired is 1.7 percentage points, and 1.8 and 1.5 for younger and older workers respectively. 
33 Simply limiting to people who do not say they are retired will not fix this effect because many people 
who are actually unemployed would call themselves retired for status reasons (Choi 2002). 
34 The base for separated is 1.9 percentage points for the universe regardless of age category. 
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6  Concluding Comments 
 Employment of workers over the age of 50 has dropped since the ADEA was 
enforced in 1979.  This drop is greater for workers in states where lawsuits are less of a 
hurdle for older workers, i.e., those states with their own age discrimination laws.  
Workers over the age of 50 in states with laws work between 1 and 1.5 fewer weeks per 
year than do workers in states without laws.  Because, on average, older workers work 
26.7 weeks per year and all workers work 45.5 weeks per year, ease of age discrimination 
lawsuit explains 5 to 8 percent of the gap in working weeks between older workers in 
states with laws and the general population.  This drop in weeks worked may seem high, 
but it is comparable to the effect that Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) find for the disabled 
after the introduction of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1991, where 
weeks worked for disabled men falls 1.4 weeks in 1993 and another 1.5 weeks between 
1993 and 1995.   
Retirement has also increased for these older workers.  Older workers in states 
with discrimination laws are .3 percentage points more likely to consider themselves 
retired than are workers in states without such laws.  Hiring has decreased significantly 
for older workers in states where it is easier to sue; older workers are .2 percentage points 
less likely to be hired in states with age discrimination laws.  Finally, separations have 
dropped, though not at a significant level.   
I find no statistically significant decline in the employment or retirement for 
younger workers, non-white workers, and female workers based on state-time variation in 
ease of age discrimination lawsuit.  A possible explanation for the difference in findings 
by race and gender is that before the advent of the ADEA, female and minority workers 
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were already protected by the Civil Rights Act (CRA), which allows for more damages; 
white men over the age of 50 are the most likely to sue under the ADEA.  Additionally, 
since these groups are not as strongly attached to the labor market, employers may think 
that they will leave their jobs before possible productivity declines due to age become an 
issue.   
I also find no negative effects on older workers in the earlier period prior to 
enforcement.  Although my results for this period are for the most part not statistically 
significant, my findings are not inconsistent with those in earlier work such as Adams 
(2004) or Neumark and Stock (1999).  It may be that before the publicity surrounding the 
enforcement of the federal law, firms did not put the probability of lawsuit into their 
hiring calculations so that older white male job applicants were not harmed. 
 Since the ADEA provides a form of employment protection, it should lead to a 
lower separation rate for older workers.  There does seem to be a protection benefit of 
this sort, although the results are not conclusive.  However, there is also a large effect on 
increased retirements for these older workers.  Employers appear to be reacting to age 
discrimination legislation and threats of lawsuits by failing to hire older workers, being 
less likely to fire or lay-off older workers but trying to remove older workers through 
retirement incentives.  In general, it appears that these age protection laws have had very 
little effect on workers under the age of 50.  
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25-34 35-44 45-54 45-49 50-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 Have Law No Law
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
age 29.22 39.54 49.43 47.00 51.97 59.21 68.96 78.52 47.35 47.83
employed 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.77 0.29 0.12 0.79 0.78
unemployed 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02
married 0.79 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.81 0.71 0.82 0.86
weeks worked 44.64 46.36 45.90 46.41 45.36 40.35 16.63 7.19 39.97 39.03
high school grad 0.81 0.71 0.62 0.64 0.60 0.49 0.35 0.26 0.64 0.58
wage income 19,160.54 22,415.62 21,130.20 21,839.40 20,392.89 16,138.39 3,581.64 864.10 18,487.63 15,097.51
weekly wage 415.12 470.15 456.49 465.41 447.03 398.53 225.50 123.54 453.72 374.46
ln(weekly wage) 5.95 6.11 6.09 6.10 6.07 5.95 5.24 4.78 6.05 5.86
retired 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.48 0.69 0.09 0.09
Observations 80,877 68,747 70,003 35,595 34,408 55,595 34,721 15,553 164,904 50,549
age 29.42 39.18 49.38 46.94 51.98 59.37 69.01 78.50 46.37 46.66
employed 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.67 0.22 0.09 0.74 0.77
unemployed 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03
married 0.62 0.78 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.82 0.74 0.75 0.81
weeks worked 44.77 46.24 45.30 46.01 44.54 35.81 11.85 4.82 38.23 38.80
high school grad 0.87 0.85 0.77 0.79 0.74 0.68 0.56 0.43 0.77 0.70
wage income 16,586.65 21,652.52 21,509.51 22,144.00 20,831.13 15,329.23 2,928.75 752.65 16,246.72 15,037.89
weekly wage 358.33 455.66 467.73 473.73 461.12 427.48 249.05 153.54 413.97 373.69
ln(weekly wage) 5.77 6.03 6.08 6.09 6.07 5.96 5.20 4.75 5.91 5.84
retired 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.005 0.015 0.130 0.601 0.775 0.13 0.11
Observations 150,194 119,063 95,009 57,414 48,748 80,812 57,522 25,208 501,941 55,740
B.  1978-1991
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for White Men by Age Group and Law Status
A.  1968-1977
NOTE:  Years refer to survey years.  Statistics are weighted using CPS person weights.  Income is inflated/deflated to 1982-1984 
dollars using the CPI.  Summary statistics are taken from the IPUMS CPS, except for data on retirement which is from the Unicon set. 
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Figure 1:  Weeks Worked Per Year
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1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Year
W
e
e
k
s
/
Y
e
a
r
Under 50 in 
states w/o laws
Under 50 in 
states with laws
Over 50 in states w/o 
laws
Over 50 in states 
with laws
Note:  Weeks worked per year from CPS generated from midpoints of 
intervalled weeks worked data, not including zeros.
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
havelaw*over50 -0.123 0.180 -1.500 -1.157
(0.575) (0.657) (0.535)** (0.527)*
havelaw*under50 -0.083 0.219 -0.010 0.326
(0.744) (0.474) (0.441) (0.510)
Observations 215,912 215,912 558,873 558,873
havelaw*over50 0.081 0.052 0.026 0.074
(0.039)* (0.036) (0.024) (0.038)
havelaw*under50 0.001 -0.029 -0.007 0.040
(0.032) (0.032) (0.018) (0.022)
Observations 160,986 160,986 396,442 396,442
havelaw*over50 -0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)** (0.001)
havelaw*under50 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007
(0.003)* (0.002)* (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 201,146 201,146 558,947 558,947
State-specific trend? no yes no yes
C.  Retirement
1968-1977 1978-1991
TABLE 2
Initial Results
B.  Log of Weekly Wages
A.  Weeks Worked per Year
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered 
on state. The table reports OLS havelaw * over 50 interactions in 
regressions that include married, high school graduate, age dummies, 
year dummies, and state dummies. The marginal of the Probit 
coefficient is reported in panel C. Universe includes all white men 
age 25 to 85. Years in charts refer to survey year. Weeks worked and 
wage information refer to the previous year, thus Weeks 1967-1976 
and 1977-1990.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
havelaw*over50 -1.396 -0.874 -1.399 -0.817
(0.564)* (0.519) (0.619)* (0.541)
havelaw*under50 -0.036 0.484 -0.111 0.474
(0.462) (0.468) (0.525) (0.425)
Observations 521,946 521,946 485,330 485,330
havelaw*over50 0.021 0.077 0.010 0.064
(0.024) (0.042) (0.024) (0.042)
havelaw*under50 -0.015 0.041 -0.019 0.034
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028)
Observations 369,888 369,888 343,676 343,676
havelaw*over50 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)
havelaw*under50 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 522,020 522,020 485,371 485,371
State-specific trend? no yes no yes
TABLE 3
B.  Log of Weekly Wages
C.  Retirement
A.  Weeks Worked per Year
1979-1991 1980-1991
Results by Varying Enforcement Year
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered 
on state. The table reports OLS havelaw * over 50 interactions in 
regressions that include married, high school graduate, age dummies, 
year dummies, and state dummies. The marginal of the Probit 
coefficient is reported in panel C. Universe includes all white men 
age 25 to 85. Years in charts refer to survey year. Weeks worked and 
wage information refer to the previous year, thus 1978-1990 and 1979-
1990.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
havelaw*over50 -0.429 -0.374 -0.788 -0.540 -1.458 -1.102
(0.459) (0.462) (0.545) (0.544) (0.542)** (0.571)
havelaw*under50 -0.303 -0.240 -0.151 0.097 -0.051 0.301
(0.427) (0.376) (0.442) (0.432) (0.434) (0.519)
Observations 427,774 427,774 469,308 469,308 530,760 530,760
havelaw*over50 0.013 0.063 0.024 0.074 0.025 0.075
(0.026) (0.030)* (0.023) (0.033)* (0.024) (0.038)
havelaw*under50 -0.009 0.040 -0.007 0.043 -0.005 0.044
(0.018) (0.015)* (0.019) (0.019)* (0.018) (0.021)*
Observations 356,807 356,807 380,009 380,009 394,207 394,207
havelaw*over50 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0019 0.0008
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006)**(0.0011)
havelaw*under50 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0022 -0.0040 -0.0050
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Observations 427,830 427,830 469,374 469,374 530,829 530,829
State-specific trend? no yes no yes no yes
B.  Log of Weekly Wages
C.  Retirement
TABLE 4
Results by Varying Top Age Tail: 1978-1991
25-59 25-64 25-74
A.  Weeks Worked per Year
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered on state. The 
table reports OLS havelaw * over 50 interactions in regressions that include 
married, high school graduate, age dummies, year dummies, and state dummies. 
The marginal of the Probit coefficient is reported in panel C. Universe includes all 
white men. Years in charts refer to survey year. Weeks worked and wage 
information refer to the previous year, thus 1977-1990.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
havelaw*over50 -0.881 -0.130 -0.547 -0.040 -1.495 -0.949 -1.068 -1.583
(0.556) (0.389) (0.927) (0.738) (0.490)** (0.548) (0.806) (0.723)*
havelaw*under50 -0.068 0.691 -0.359 0.061 -0.167 0.367 0.459 -0.067
(0.216) (0.493) (0.788) (0.608) (0.386) (0.564) (0.626) (0.617)
Observations 620,885 620,885 67,596 67,596 427,817 427,817 131,056 131,056
havelaw*over50 0.004 0.028 0.099 0.210 0.02 0.058 0.02 0.096
(0.019) (0.027) (0.063) (0.055)** (0.021) (0.031) (0.036) (0.070)
havelaw*under50 -0.012 0.010 -0.043 0.064 -0.018 0.020 0.004 0.081
(0.014) (0.021) (0.051) (0.028)* (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.052)
Observations 327,164 327,164 47,468 47,468 290,414 290,414 106,028 106,028
havelaw*over50 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)** (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)*
havelaw*under50 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 0.001 0.002
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.005)* (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)* (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 605,027 605,027 62,963 62,963 429,678 429,678 109,059 109,059
State-specific trend? no yes no yes no yes no yes
TABLE 5
B.  Log of Weekly Wages
C.  Retirement
Not College Grad College Grad
A.  Weeks Worked per Year
Results by Varying Gender, Race, and Education of Universe, 1978-1991
White Women Black Men
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered on state. The table reports OLS havelaw * 
over 50 interactions in regressions that include married, high school graduate, age dummies, year dummies, 
and state dummies. The marginal of the Probit coefficient is reported in panel C. Years in charts refer to 
survey year. Weeks worked and wage information refer to the previous year, thus 1977-1990.  Universe 
includes people between the ages of 25 and 85 inclusive.  Not College Grad and Collge Grad columns are 
white men only.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
male*over50*havelaw 0.366 0.366 -1.710 -1.708
(0.673) (0.674) (0.557)** (0.555)**
male*under50*havelaw 1.347 1.348 -1.569 -1.566
(0.911) (0.912) (0.913) (0.912)
male*over50 15.820 15.818 12.476 12.474
(0.671)** (0.671)** (0.553)** (0.550)**
male*under50 21.468 21.467 14.356 14.353
(0.655)** (0.655)** (0.831)** (0.830)**
havelaw*over50 0.250 0.248 -0.359 0.147
(0.425) (0.388) (0.379) (0.399)
havelaw*under50 -1.058 -1.057 0.752 1.258
(0.831) (0.754) (0.423) (0.787)
Observations 460,122 460,122 1,179,758 1,179,758
havelaw*over50 -0.036 -1.483
(0.875) (0.637)*
Observations 215,912 558,873
State-specific trend? no yes no yes
Alternative Identification Strategies
B.  Havelaw * Over50 with State*Time
TABLE 6
Weeks Worked
A.  D-D-D Women and Havelaw
1968-1977 1978-1991
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered 
on state. Panel A reports OLS male * havelaw * over 50 interactions 
in regressions that include married, high school graduate, age 
dummies, year dummies, and state dummies. Panel A includes all 
white men and women age 25-85. Panel B reports OLS havelaw * 
over 50 interactions in regressions that include married, high school 
graduate, age dummies, year dummies, and state dummies. Panel B 
includes all white men age 25-85. Years in charts refer to survey 
year. Weeks worked refers to the previous year, thus 1967-1976 and 
1977-1990.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
havelaw*over50 -0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0029 -0.0023
(0.0008)** (0.0008)** (0.0009)** (0.0010)*
havelaw*under50 0.002 0.0018 0.0019 0.0017
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0009)* (0.0009)
Observations 4351023 4351023 4351023 4351023
havelaw*over50 -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0006
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012)
havelaw*under50 0.0034 0.0031 0.0036 0.0034
(0.0016)* (0.0016)* (0.0022) (0.0021)
Observations 4351023 4351023 4351023 4351023
Controls? no yes no yes
State-specific trend? no no yes yes
TABLE 7
Results on Hiring/Separation Margins: 1978-1991
A.  Hired
B.  Separated
NOTES. -- Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered 
on state. The table reports the marginal coefficient of havelaw * over 
50 interactions in probits that include married, high school graduate, 
age dummies, year dummies, and state dummies. Marginal effects 
are reported. (OLS regressions look very similar). Universe includes 
all white men age 25 to 85. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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